While it is certainly in America’s interests to promote democratic institutions around the world, it does not follow that armed regime change is the best tool for supplanting odious regimes and advancing US security and humanitarian goals. The historical record illustrates that armed regime-change missions rarely succeed as intended and are often accompanied by unintended consequences, such as human rights crises and weakened internal stability within the targeted State.
Advocates of regime change tend to frame their arguments in terms of desirability rather than cost. They ignore the fact that forcible democratization is likely to be an extremely lengthy institution-building mission that may fail to achieve predetermined goals, such as a thriving democracy. In order to avoid these pitfalls, policymakers should acknowledge that their regime-change efforts are likely to spiral into lengthy, costly military operations and be prepared to commit the necessary resources for success.
Moreover, they should recognize that the forcible overthrow of foreign governments violates fundamental international law norms of non-interference and degrades a State’s autonomy by making decisions about its internal affairs. This is a significant burden for proponents of regime change to carry and they have not been able to overcome it despite a logically appealing but normatively weak argument about democracy promotion. Ultimately, the case for a negotiated transition with an internationally-recognized leader like South Africa is far more compelling than the case for a regime change operation in places where the current government has a legitimate claim to being representative of the people.
About the Author
